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ABSTRACT 
Existing literature on IT standards focuses on the role of technical factors such as network effects 
and competitive behavior on the creation of standards.  However, the role of users and vendors in 
initiating the standards definition and ratification process is less well understood. Given the 
advantages associated with standards, all users and vendors of IT products would be expected to 
be glad to participate in the standards definition and ratification process. However, if that were the 
case, many fewer proprietary technologies would compete. This paper explains qualitatively why 
users, vendors, and government bodies choose (or don’t choose) to participate in the standards 
definition and ratification process. A better understanding of their motivations for participating or 
not in the process should help to attract more participants to the process. The paper concludes by 
analyzing strategies to recover the cost of standards definition and ratification process, and their 
impact on the standards adoption rate. 
KEYWORDS: communications standards, standards development, standards evolution, IT 
standards. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IT standards dictate the consensus rules for designing, producing, testing, and installing IT 
products, services, and systems. These standards are important because they: 
•  lower the costs associated with developing and deploying IT systems, and   
• make these systems more efficient and compatible.  
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Among practitioners, standards development is considered very important. Many large industries 
are based on standards. For example, the Ethernet standards (ISO/IEC1 8802.3 CSMA/CD) built 
an industry from nearly zero in 1980 to many billions2 today. Therefore, business organizations 
and government bodies spent considerable time and effort on the standards definition and 
ratification process.  
The importance of standards is also evident in the amount of academic research on the subject. 
For example, early work in the industrial organization literature studied the effect of network 
externalities on de facto standardization [e.g., Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 
1986, 1992]. Specific issues addressed by these studies include-  
• the role of the prior reputation of firms on their compatibility decisions [Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985],  
• the impact of incomplete information on adopting incompatible technologies [Farrell 
and Saloner, 1986], and  
• the role of technology sponsorship on the emergence of de facto standards [Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986].  
More relevant to IS researchers, some of these studies focused on the role of technology 
sponsorship in creating a strategic advantage when incompatible technologies compete in 
markets with network externalities [e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986].  
Another important finding relevant to IT industry is that the strength of consumer preferences for 
software variety drives the equilibrium outcomes for hardware platforms. For example, when 
consumers value the variety of available software more than they value the variety in hardware, 
the equilibrium outcome is a de facto standardization in the hardware market. In these markets, 
the hardware is supported by the majority of software providers, becomes the dominant hardware 
platform [Church and Gandal, 1992]. Research in information systems though, is not rich in 
addressing standards-related issues. However, IS researchers did focus on factors that impact 
the adoption of IT systems based on particular communication standards. For example, a large 
body of literature deals with the adoption of EDI systems [e.g., Iacovou et al., 1995; Chau, 2001; 
Iskandar et al., 2001; Mukhopadhyay, 1995]. These studies provide guidance to practitioners and 
academics in understanding diffusion of standards. 
In summary, the industrial organization literature predominantly deals with understanding the 
emergence of de facto standards, while the information systems literature focuses on the 
diffusion and adoption of these standards. While these issues are important, they do not cover 
the broad dynamics of the formal standards definition and ratification process. In particular, little is 
understood about the activities that take place during the initial phase of any standards 
development. In this phase someone - an individual, an organization, and/or a government body - 
decides to take the first step towards defining and then ratifying a standard. They then attempt to 
attract others to participate in the process. Attracting more members to participate in the process 
is important because it impacts adoption directly, and thereby, the success of a standard.  
Furthermore, the greater the number of participants, the easier it is to recover the costs of 
defining, developing, and promoting the standard.  
                                                     
1 International Electrotechnical Commission 
2 A billion in the U.S. is 1000 million but a million million in the U.K. CAIS uses the 1000 million 
definition.  
A Qualitative Analysis of the Role of Users, Vendors, and Governments in the Standards 
Development Process by Ravi Sen 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 17, 2006), 57-70 59 
II. THE STANDARDS PROCESS 
This paper takes a qualitative approach to explaining the motivation of users, vendors, and 
government bodies in initiating the standards development and ratification process. It attempts to 
address questions such as: 
• Who is more likely to initiate the standards definition and ratification process?  
• What are the underlying motivations of the participants?  
• What are the factors that keep the affected parties from participating?  
• What is the cost of participation in the process?   
Before addressing these issues formally, we discuss the formal process by which standards are 
defined, proposed, refined, and finally ratified as national and international standards. The 
ultimate goal of any IT standard is to become an international standard because international 
standards enable a single design to 
• cross country boundaries without technology barriers,  
• 
eing part of the process do so by being affiliated to one or 
 SDOs and submit the proposed specification(s) directly for 
inclusio s. 
 
                                                     
build large user pools, and  
• reduce product/application design costs. 
At the inception/definition phase of the standards development process, an interested party 
decides to initiate the process either on its own or in collaboration with others. It should be noted 
at this point that for the remainder of this paper, potential initiators (i.e., those who take the first 
step and initiate the standards development process) are classified as vendors, user 
organizations (or users), and government/privately funded organizations (e.g., regional and 
national SDOs3). Vendors are defined as those organizations which can incorporate the 
standards in the products and services that they sell to the user organizations. This paper 
assumes that individuals interested in b
more of the aforementioned initiators.  
Figure 1 shows the multiple paths to an ISO/IEC JTC1 recognized international standard 
[Robinson, 1999]. For example, the standard could be developed in one of the subcommittees of 
professional communities (e.g., such as IEEE P802 does in its subcommittee six (SC6)) and then 
submitted, via one of the national Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) or directly, to 
the international SDO. Another option is that a standard is developed by a business organization 
or a group of business organizations (e.g. consortium). This standard is then ratified through the 
Publicly Available Standards (PAS) process. This process allows the standards developers to 
bypass the regional and national
n into ISO/IEC standard
3 SDOs are organizations that develop and maintain the models, data dictionaries, structure, 
syntax, and implementation materials for standards. 
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Individuals Business Organizations
Regional SDOs, e.g. ECMA  
International SDO, 
e.g., ISO/IEC JTC1  
National SDOs, 
e.g. ANSI, DIN,  
BSI, ANFOR   
Professional 
Communities,
e.g. IEEE 
Figure 1: Standards Development Process- From Inception to Acceptance 
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The following section provides a qualitative explanation of the rationale behind the decision to 
participate or abstain from the standards definition and ratification process. 
II. PARTICIPATE IN THE STANDARDS DEFINITION AND RATIFICATION PROCESS OR 
NOT? 
Figure 1 shows the various stakeholders involved in the standards definition and ratification 
process. However, for many of these entities (e.g. IT vendors, government organizations) 
standards definition and ratification is not their primary task. The history of IT standards entities 
shows that many stakeholders do not become engaged in the standards definition process, even 
though they may adopt the standards at a later stage. For example, TCP/IP standards were 
defined by the joint initiative of the US Department of Defense and academic institutions before 
they became widely accepted and adopted throughout the world, while HTTP standards for online 
document formats and standards for EDI communication were initially defined by the IT vendors 
before they evolved into well defined, universally accepted standards. The following subsections 
explain the decision of these various stakeholders (i.e. vendors, users, and governments) to 
participate in or abstain from the standards definition and ratification process that goes on in their 
relevant industries.  
USERS AND STANDARDS DEFINITION 
Existing literature and anecdotal evidence from industry suggest that users can benefit greatly 
from IT standards. In particular, two strong incentives to support initiatives aimed at defining and 
ratifying standards are:  
• to commoditize the product, and  
• to minimize the cost of deploying and managing communications systems that link 
them with other users.  
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Therefore it seems logical to argue that users should be in the forefront of any standards 
definition and ratification initiative. This, however, is not always the case. All user organizations 
are not actively involved in the standards definition process.  
To illustrate this point, consider a simple strategic game. The game involves two users, who can 
either decide to initiate the standards definition process. The cost to initiate the process is c. 
Alternatively, the users can abstain from the process. The important feature of this game, as a 
model of providing a  public good, is that if both players choose to participate in the process they 
both pay the full cost, i.e. c, as opposed to sharing the cost equally. One interpretation of this 
assumption is that the two users belong to a committee or consortium of users. The opportunity 
cost of time spent in attending the meeting is c for each participant and the number of other 
participants does not affect this cost [Fundenberg and Tirole, 2000]. Once the standards are 
defined, both benefit from these standards.  This benefit is 1 for each user. The payoffs for the 
two users are shown in Figure 2. The pure strategy Nash equilibriums of this game are that one 
user initiates the standards development process, while the other abstains from participating in 
this process. 
 Participate Abstain 
Participate (1-c), (1-c) (1-c), 1 
Abstain 1, (1-c) 0,0 
 
Figure 2: Standards Public/Shared Goods 
Thus, in a more general setting, we should expect to find some user organizations getting 
together to form a consortium and initiate the standards definition and ratification process, while 
the remaining user organizations abstain from the process. However, the abstaining user 
organizations may adopt the standards once they are ratified by the national and international 
standards development organizations. This simple model explains why some user organizations 
would participate while other would abstain from the standards definition and ratification process. 
However, it provides no clues about the rationale behind these decisions. 
Two reasons why some users may be reluctant to participate in this process are: 
1. The users could end up paying a higher price for compatible systems that emerge 
due to the presence of standards [Shy, 2001]. These price premiums could far 
exceed any benefits that result from the compatibility brought about by standards 
[Shy, 2001]. Furthermore, in the absence of relevant standards, the users’ desire for 
compatibility intensifies competition among incompatible systems, resulting in 
reduced prices [Shy, 2001]. Therefore, some users would prefer to abstain from any 
process (i.e. the standards definition and ratification process) that would ultimately 
result in standards.  
2. Some users (individuals and/or organizations) want to obtain the benefit of the 
standards without spending resources on the standards definition and ratification 
process. This outcome results from the “free rider” problem often associated with 
providing any public goods.  
Why do users participate in the standards definition and ratification process?  
1.  The user firms that already use some proprietary standards want these standards to 
be ratified as national and international standards. A good example is the case of 
Web Services, where firms such as IBM and Microsoft developed technologies to 
meet their own needs. They then realized that they created something that could be 
useful in a wider context. This realization prompted them to initiate the standards 
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definition and ratification process by submitting their proprietary standards to national 
and international standards development organizations for approval. It should be 
noted at this point that these users could also act as vendors, in the wider context, 
when they benefit by selling products and applications based on these standards.  
2. If the user firms are dominant in the industry, they can dictate the communication 
standards that are adopted in their industry. For example, in the automobile industry, 
the auto manufacturers were instrumental in the adoption of EDI. Another example is 
the financial services industry where 29 major firms, including Bank of America, Citi 
Bank, Wells Fargo, and MasterCard formed a consortium4  to develop financial web 
services standards. In this same industry, in 1996, Visa and MasterCard jointly 
developed a single standard, called Secure Electronic Transactions (SET), to secure 
payment card transactions over insecure networks. Other major card brands, 
including American Express and NOVUS (Discover), later endorsed the SET 
standard. 
Even if the reasons why a user organization wants to participate in standards development 
process can be explained, how do we explain their acceptance of free riders? One explanation 
lies in the very nature of standards. That is, the standard displays consumption or network 
externalities, and provides significant economies of scale, i.e. larger the number of organizations 
that adopt the standards, greater is the benefit to the adopters. This rationale is also supported by 
the economic theory of clubs [Buchanan, 1965]. This theory describes and formalizes the 
institutional properties of a new category of goods (or product) lying between the public and 
private polar extremes, i.e., conventionally called shared good (e.g. IT standards). Only members 
participating in a voluntary association, i.e., a club whose membership may be regulated by some 
dues, usually enjoy these goods. However, the traditional club model implies that the value 
generated by the shared good decreases as the number of users increase [Buchanan, 1965]. 
However, in case of network products (e.g. IT standards) “the performance of the product as well 
as its utility increases with the increase of the community of users” [Antonelli and Foray, 1992]. 
Therefore, user organizations that initially get together to initiate the standards definition and 
ratification process, accept free riders at a later stage when the standards, which are network 
products, are ready for adoption.  
The costs associated with standards definition and ratification can be recovered by charging a 
licensing fee (if the standards are for sale) from vendors who use these standards in their 
products and services. Since the license fee generated is proportional to the number of users 
who use products and services based on the standards, it is in the interest of the users to accept 
free riders. While the participation of users in the standards definition and ratification process is 
hindered by the free rider problem, the participation decision for vendors is also not a 
straightforward issue. The following section analyzes the motivation behind a vendor’s decision to 
participate in the standards definition and ratification process or abstain from it. 
VENDORS AND STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
Previous debates on standardization emphasized the impact of technological compatibility on 
inter-firm competition [Besen and Farrell, 1994; Baseman et al., 1996]. On one hand, consumers 
assign higher value to products that give them access to large networks. They therefore are more 
willing to pay for compatible goods. On the other hand, compatibility may increase product 
substitutability, thereby leading to increased competition. For example, producing software that is 
compatible with a dominant hardware yields higher sales. However, doing so will lead to more 
competition with other software producers [Church and Gandal, 1992]). Thus, tension between 
standardization (i.e. providing compatibility), and unique capability (i.e. achieving a 
business/competitive advantage) is inherent. Vendors face a choice between making their 
                                                     
4 The Interactive Financial eXchange Forum 
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products compatible with those of their competitors (i.e. competing within a standard), or to make 
them incompatible (i.e. competing on standards). Vendors cannot postpone the decision for long 
because, in network markets, the coexistence of incompatible products may be unstable, and a 
single winning standard finally emerges and dominates the market [Besen and Farrel, 1994]. 
Competing on Standards 
A firm would want to compete on standards for two reasons: 
1. It may want to use its technical incompatibility as a strategic tool to gain market 
dominance. For example, Microsoft used technical incompatibility, as part of its 
competitive strategy to emerge as the dominant player, and then maintain the 
dominant position in the market for operating system software [Baseman et al., 
1996].  
2. If a firm controls a technology that becomes established as a standard at a later date, 
the firm can achieve an extremely profitable market position [Ferguson and Moris, 
1993]. Examples include IBM’s historical dominance of the mainframe computer 
industry, Microsoft’s dominance of the desktop operating systems market, Intel’s 
position in the microprocessor market..  
There are, however, two major drawbacks to competition between standards.  
1. Vendors who compete fiercely to have their technologies become the standard may 
dissipate part (perhaps a large part) of the potential gains. For example, when users’ 
preferences exhibit network externalities (i.e. users prefer compatibility), and if the 
competing products are incompatible and differentiated, then prices and profit levels 
decline due to fierce competition between the vendors [Shy, 2001].  
2. A competition between standards may delay market growth by encouraging buyers to 
wait for the dominant standard to emerge before they make purchase decisions 
[Business Week, 1993]. 
The alternative choice for the vendors is that they compete within a standard, i.e. they 
standardize, thus explicitly or implicitly agree to make their products compatible. Agreeing on a 
standard may eliminate competition between technologies, but it does not eliminate competition 
altogether. Instead, it channels it into other dimensions, such as price, service, and product 
features. However, competition in these dimensions may not be bad. For example, industry 
profits tend to be higher when firms choose compatibility over incompatibility [Shy, 2001].  
Participating in the Standards Process 
If vendors decide that it is better to standardize, they face the question of whether or not to 
participating in the standards definition process. Vendors who decide not to participate in the 
standards definition and ratification process can still make their products comply with the 
standards that ultimately emerge at the end of the process. They may, however, be required to 
pay a higher fee for using the standards (assuming the standards require payment) and incur a 
significant switching cost when producing/using products and services based on the new 
standards. In addition, they can be caught unaware when a new standard influenced by 
competitors is published. On the positive side, non-participating vendors save on the cost of 
participating in the standards definition and ratification process (e.g. membership fees).  
Being a part of the process offers benefits. These benefits include: 
1. Influence the direction of the process, leading to standards that are more favorable to 
(or compatible with) their existing products and services. This compatibility should 
provide them with significant commercial and competitive advantage in their 
respective markets.  
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2. Their products based on these new standards would be backward compatible with 
their existing products and services. Their existing customers would find ikt easier to 
adopt the products and services based on the new standards.  
3. Vendors that participate in the standards definition and ratification process also benefit 
from reduced cost of purchasing the standards (i.e. buying the license to use them), 
and reduced cost of switching to these new standards.  
4. By participating in the standards development process, an organization gets an 
opportunity to develop close relationships with other participants such as customers, 
competitors and regulatory authorities. 
Choosing a Policy 
Given the reasons for competing within standards and competing between standards, is it 
possible to predict if vendors would choose the latter or the former?  
Vendors are more likely to choose incompatibility, i.e. compete between standards when-  
• they are symmetric in their market and technology positions;  
• the standards battle alone does not greatly delay the adoption of the technology by 
consumers; and  
• within-standards competition is especially likely to dissipate potential industry profits 
[Besen and Farrel, 1994].  
If one or more of these conditions are not satisfied, then the firms are more likely to compete 
within standards. However, before they do so, they need to converge towards a standard through 
a formal process (e.g. form a consortium to define the standards) or through some informal forces 
where all the vendors gravitate towards the proprietary standards of one or more of these firms.  
One way to study this choice is to model the vendors’ decision problem as a strategic form game 
similar to the “battle of sexes”.  Consider two vendors each whom would prefer its own 
technology as the standard, but each would prefer compatibility with its rival’s technology to going 
it alone. This type of strategic behavior is often visible when one vendor has already incorporated 
an attribute in its products, and the adoption of other vendor’s product suffers because of the lack 
of this attribute. At the same time, both vendors realize that between-standards competition is 
likely to dissipate potential industry profits.  
If the two proprietary standards are denoted by S1 and S2, the payoffs for this game are shown in 
Figure 3. The game’s pure strategy equilibrium occurs when the vendors agree to accept one or 
the other proprietary standard as the industry standard.  
                                            S1             S2 
S1 2,1 0,0 
S2 0,0 1,2 
 
Figure 3: Vendor Participation 
The pure strategy equilibrium of this game illustrates how the two vendors would agree on one of 
the given standards. However, it does not tell us which standard these vendors will agree upon. 
In some cases, one vendor will accept the proprietary standard of the other vendor as an industry 
standard because that proprietary standard is already well established and the non-compliant 
vendor does not want to invest resources in defining, developing, and promoting a new standard 
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to compete with this established standard. This outcome is illustrated by the example of Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL/TLS) standards. Sensitive online traffic is usually protected by a cryptographic 
system originally called Secure Socket Layer (SSL). SSL originally was created by Netscape and 
placed in its Navigator browser. Later, all major browser vendors, including Microsoft’s Explore, 
supported SSL, making SSL a de facto standard. Later, the standardization effort was passed to 
the IETF, which renamed the standards Transport Layer Security (TLS).  
Another way by which the vendors agree on a standard is when the vendor who wants its’ 
standard to be adopted offers some incentive to the other vendors to agree. Incentives can 
include low-cost licensing, commitment to join future development, and promising timely 
information about upgrades. [Besen and Farrel, 1994]. 
A possible outcome, not captured by the game in Figure 3 is that both firms agree on a standard 
which is a hybrid of their proprietary standard or develop a new standard from scratch. This 
outcome is most likely, when 
• the firms are symmetric in their market and technology positions;  
• the standards battle is delaying the adoption of the technology by consumers; and  
• inter-technology competition is especially likely to dissipate potential industry profits.  
The case of Remote Access Servers (RAS) illustrates this outcome. Early remote users were 
required to dial into sites using a telephone modem and PPP (Point to Point Protocol).5 They 
connected to a remote access server (RAS) at the site. The RAS authenticated them and then 
gave them access to other computers at the site. The earlier systems for RAS access control 
used proprietary protocols that differed among RAS vendors. To address the lack of RAS 
standards and the need to manage multiple RASs, vendors collaborated on a way to implement 
policy-based authentication on remote access servers. Their standard was the Remote 
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS).   
GOVERNMENT AND STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
Governments are involved in standards development process through national standards 
developing organizations (e.g. ANSI6) and professional bodies (e.g., IEEE7). Government’s are 
involved because:  
• They themselves are major user of IT products.  
As users governments want to participate in the standards definition and ratification 
process like any other user organization. For instance, they use some proprietary 
standards, and they want these to be confirmed as national and international 
standards.  In addition, they may want to leverage their position as a major consumer 
of IT products by influencing standards definition favorable to IT products and 
services that they already use. 
• They are interested in long-term social welfare. 
Governments ensure long-term social welfare by mitigating factors that potentially 
lead to the failure of a standards definition and ratification process. They do so, by 
providing an environment (e.g., through national Standards Development 
Organizations (SDOs)) in which vendors and users can get together to define 
                                                     
5 Protocol encapsulating a connection to a TCP/IP network through a modem and a telephone line. 
6 American National Standards Institute 
7 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
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standards. The government also claims to take the long-term view (e.g., 
interoperability, scalability, extensibility, accessibility, etc.) about standards 
development, instead of satisfying short-term user (e.g. compatibility with their legacy 
systems) and vendor (e.g. short-term profitability) goals. Governments try to enlarge 
social welfare through  
1. preventing situations where standards could be used for monopolistic gains,  
2. keeping the standards process as open and flexible and possible,  
3. ensuring that the standards themselves are non-proprietary and  interoperable.  
From an economics perspective, by participating in standards development, 
government facilitates the development of interoperable systems. Interoperability, in 
turn fosters competition which is key to any market economy. 
• They are interested in safeguarding the competitiveness of their domestic industries 
[Jensen and Thursby, 1996].  
International R&D competition often results in outcomes where several firms develop 
and patent products that are close substitutes, but are based on different standards. 
In this situation, it is not uncommon for governments to set anticipatory standards 
intended to improve the strategic (competitive) position of their domestic firms. The 
following are examples:  
1. In the United States, the National Competitiveness Act of 1993 and various 
congressional studies (US Congress 1988 and 1992) recommend the use of 
standards to support US industry in technology development.  
2. Federal Communications Commission regulations required that high 
definition TV (HDTV) transmission in the US should either be compatible with 
receivers used in USA, or should allow simultaneous broadcast with existing 
channels. This regulation was generally considered to be a strategic move to 
improve the position of US firms trying to develop HDTV against the 
Japanese advantage in the area. It meant that the Japanese MUSE system 
could not be used in the United States without adaptation. Similarly, Europe 
never adopted a single color TV standard because individual governments 
promoted standards to protect the interest of their domestic firms [Hazard 
and Daems, 1988; Pelkmans and Beuter, 1987]. 
III. COST OF PARTICIPATION AND STANDARDS ADOPTION  
In Section II, the cost of participating in the standards definition and ratification process emerged 
as a key variable that affects the decision. In this section, we discuss how this cost could be 
recovered. We address this issue by qualitatively analyzing the popular cost recovery strategies 
and how these strategies affect the rate of standards adoption at a later stage. 
Participants bear the costs of the standards definition and ratification process. For example, in 
addition to the costs involved in communication, coordination and administration of the process 
itself, the standards must be printed and distributed. Furthermore, every few years, a standard 
must be revised, reaffirmed, or withdrawn to address current technology. Considerable costs are 
incurred in promoting the acceptance of standards in the marketplace, such as investment in 
education of potential adopters about the merit and integrity of standards.  
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One way to recover these costs is through selling standards (e.g. royalties, subscription). For 
example, both Microsoft and IBM used so-called “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (Rand) 
licensing to cover intellectual property in some of “their” standards. The companies charged 
others to use patented parts of these standards. Another example is Apple, which charged for its 
technology in the FireWire interface for some years. One drawback with selling the standards is 
that it can delay its widespread adoption. The cost of managing the standards definition and 
ratification process can also be recovered through membership fees from organizations that 
decide to participate in the process. A major drawback of this strategy is that it encourages free 
riders. Thus, any cost recovery strategy needs to find the optimal combination of membership 
cost and the sales price for the standards in order to minimize free riding and increase the 
adoption rate (Table 1).  
Table 1. Strategies for Recovering the Cost of Standards Development 
Membership Fee  
Low High 
Low 
• Difficult to recover costs 
• Attract more participation 
• Encourage free riding 
• Encourage fast standards 
adoption  
• Easier to recover costs 
• Attract less participation 
• Encourage free riding,  
• Encourage fast standards 
adoption among non-
participants 
Sales Price 
of 
Standards 
High 
• Easier to recover costs  
• Attract more participation 
• Encourage fast standards 
adoption among 
participants 
• Discourage free riding 
• Easiest to recover costs 
• Attract less participation 
• Discourage free riding,  
• Slow standards adoption 
 
Most government bodies involved in standards definition generally operate on the strategy of 
minimal membership fee and minimal sales cost. This strategy encourages both free riding and 
participation. It also results in faster adoption rates. Governments can afford this strategy by 
subsidizing the standards definition and ratification process.  
If the process is initiated and undertaken by business organizations, it must be fully funded by 
selling the standards and/or membership fee. Table 1 shows that a good strategy for business 
organizations is the one in which participating members pay a low membership fee, allowing for a 
large participation, while the non-participating members pay a relatively high amount to use the 
standards to discourage free riding. Higher participation also results in a faster adoption rate.  
The worst strategy for cost recovery is the one in which the membership fee is high and the 
standards are sold at a high price. This strategy prevents free riding but also slows down the 
adoption of the standards. If a few participants want to influence the standards in their favor, they 
are better off by adopting the strategy where they charge a high membership fee and a then sell 
the resulting standard at a minimum price (ideally allow it to be used for free). A minimum sale 
price encourages free riders but also accelerate the standards’ adoption rate. A high membership 
fee reduce the number of members and the fewer remaining members have a stronger influence 
on the final definition of standards. Therefore, participants with a lot at stake (e.g. a large 
deployed base of existing products based on their proprietary standard) have an incentive to 
advocate giving away of the standards for free and recovering the cost of standards development 
through a membership fee. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Standards, once set, are difficult to change. They do evolve with technology. The early 
participants in the process significantly influence on the standards that we end up with. Therefore, 
it is important to understand who these early participants are and their motivation for initiating the 
standards definition and ratification process. This understanding will help to improve the process 
by –  
• getting more participation from relevant organizations,  
• increasing the rate of adoption for the final standards, and  
• enabling a faster recovery of the costs associated with the process.  
A qualitative analysis of the issue shows that users gain the most from standards. However, not 
all users participate because they either want a free ride  or fear that they may end up paying 
extra for the compatibility brought about by these standards. Vendors’ participation depends on 
whether they want to compete on standards or within standards. This paper identifies macro-level 
conditions under which vendors would prefer to compete between standards and conditions 
under which they would prefer to compete within standards. The paper also analyzes strategies 
to recover the costs associated with a standards definition and ratification process, and the 
impact of costs on the standards adoption rate.  
Admittedly, this paper is qualitative and takes a simplified approach to address complex issues. 
This approach was intentional so as to be able to analyze the issue of standards development 
from a broader perspective and tp help explain the macro environment in which standards 
definition and ratification process is initiated. A discussion of this macro-environment in 
conjunction with the issues already studied (e.g. factors that affect standards adoption, factors 
that influence the emergence of one standard over another), and issues still under investigation 
(e.g. adoption of standards across industries and nations, optimal standards development 
process, and technical specifications of standards themselves), will provide us with a better 
understanding of the evolution of IT standards. 
Editor’s Note: This article was received on August 19, 2005 and was published on January  __, 
2006. The article was with the author for one revision. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ANSI- The American National Standards Institute 
CSMA/CD- Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection 
EDI- Electronic Data Interchange 
HTTP- Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
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IEC- International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF- Internet Engineering Task Force 
IP- Internet Protocol 
ISO- International Standards Organization 
IT- Information Technology 
JTC1- Joint (ISO and IEC) Technical Committee 1 
PAS- Publicly Available Standards 
PPP- Point-to-Point Protocol 
RADIUS- Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 
RAS- Remote Access Servers 
SDO- Standards Development Organizations 
SET- Secure Electronic Transactions 
SSL- Secure Socket Layer 
TCP- Transmission Control Protocol 
TLS- Transport Layer Security 
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